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1. Introduction 
 
I would emphasise at the outset of this paper that this is indeed very much ‘work in 
progress’ and is not an academic paper stricto sensu1. It is an attempt to work out on 
paper some dissatisfactions that I have been developing about the directions that 
postconflict statebuilding is taking and in particular, the implications for postconflict land 
administration that current approaches are mandating as the ‘correct’ approach as 
evidenced by the plethora of official guides, handbooks, reports and soft international 
legal instruments that have been and are being produced by the international community 
for use in postconflict states. I should make clear at the outset that my concerns are not 
original; other commentators are voicing similar concerns in general though not so much 
on the direction postconflict land administration is going. 
 
My concerns have been focused by work I have been doing for UN-Habitat in 
Afghanistan, Somaliland and Liberia, and the UN and UNDP on local government 
institutions for Mogadishu in Somalia. UN-Habitat’s Country Report on Liberia focusing 
on the urban sector went some of the way towards re-orientating my thinking on these 
                                                 
1 In large part, it consists of edited reports written for various UN and other agencies with additional ex post 
commentaries. Nor can I claim that because it consists of reports to UN agencies, it will have impact. The 
reports may not even be read or if read acted upon. Parts 1 – 3 were written in Nairobi in April 2010 during 
a UNDP mission to participate in a workshop on local government in Mogadishu; Part 4 was written in the 
UK and in Nairobi; Part 5 was written in Monrovia, when I was on a UN-Habitat mission there, and in Dar 
es Salaam when I was on a World Bank funded mission reviewing Tanzania’s land registration system, 
both in November 2009; Part 6 is a revised, updated and expanded version of part of an unpublished paper 
given at a conference on Law and Development in Cornell University Law School in 2004 which together 
with the Conclusions were written in Hargeisa when I was on a UN-Habitat mission on land issues in 
Somaliland in April 2010. The part dealing with an urban transformation law draws on a report on 
suggested reforms to urban planning laws in Syria written in 2007. Not all footnotes are complete.  
There’s not much to do in Hargeisa in the evenings or at the weekends. Hargeisa is a UN security rated 
level 3 post. This means that UN staff are confined to their hotels at the weekends and from 6.30 pm daily 
unless we have to go out to see persons on official UN business. In theory we can go out in a UN vehicle to 
a UN approved restaurant or other hotel for a meal but no such places exist in Hargeisa unlike Kabul and 
Monrovia where there are several UN approved (on security grounds) restaurants and hotels one could go 
to which were of quite a good culinary standard together with a reasonable selection of wines.      
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issues, but matters really came to a head on my reaction to a proposed local government 
law for Mogadishu. But we need to start at the beginning. 
 
2. The Liberal Peace Agenda and its critics 
 
The peacemaking and statebuilding industry is about two decades old2. It got underway 
in the aftermath of the wars that accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s; 
once the UN became involved in Cambodia and Timor Leste, it rapidly developed as a 
branch of international administration with its own agencies (OCHA in the UN and a 
separate division in the World Bank and in many bilateral agencies), approaches, 
principles via soft international law, commentaries and inevitably rivalries between 
countries involved in the provision of peacekeeping and statebuilding services, agencies 
within countries and tensions between providers and receivers of the various services on 
offer. I allude to some of these rivalries in my paper on Afghanistan in Amanda’s edited 
volume3. Right now there are upwards of 20 UN-led peacemaking and statebuilding 
operations in existence, of which the largest number are in Africa. 
                                                
 
The current orthodoxy has been called the “contemporary liberal peace thesis”4. I prefer 
to call it the liberal peace agenda (LPA). It derives its legitimacy and its legality from the 
2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) which propounded the thesis that “where gross human rights abuses are 
occurring, it is the duty of the international community to intervene, over and above 
considerations of state sovereignty”5 (what is now known as the Responsibility to Protect 
or R2P). The General Assembly of the UN endorsed this report and stated that the 
international community should be prepared to intervene in such situations through the 
Security Council.  
 
So far so good. But the issue which sparks most debate is the nature of intervention in the 
reconstruction of postconflict and/or failed states. Should it be externally driven or 
internally led and what should be the aims of the process; what outcomes are being 
 
2 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Risk (2009) (eds) The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the 
contradictions of postwar peace operations, and Vincent Chetail (2009) (ed) Post-Conflict Peacebuilding; 
A Lexicon for very useful introductions to the subject.  
3 P. McAuslan (2009) Land and Power in Afghanistan: in pursuit of Law and Justice? In A. Perry-Kessaris 
(ed) Law in Pursuit of Development   
4 Paris in J. Milliken (2003) (ed) State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction.  
5 The Responsibility to Protect (2001). Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty; International Development Research Centre Ottawa. 
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sought? Many commentators have raised serious concerns about the implications of 
externally driven interventions. States can only be build on strong foundations of social 
capital and indigenous beliefs and approaches. Durable institutions can only be built 
through processes of decision-making characterised by informed discourse among the 
people of a society. Attempting to develop new institutions on the basis of international 
best practice inevitably excludes the mobilising of public consent. Internal actors are 
disempowered by the presence and capacity of external actors. Perhaps more important 
than all these very valid concerns is the ideology behind external intervention.  The aim is 
to create a liberal economic order – the free market economy – bolstered by a veneer of 
democracy legitimised by periodic elections and political institutions which replicate on 
the surface those found in the West. So the LPA is at best a variant of the post-
Washington consensus.  
 
Those arguing for external intervention do not dispute the ultimate and ideological aims 
of intervention. Their concern is that if state reconstruction is left to internal actors, 
nothing will change from what caused the state breakdown in the past. Calls for internal 
leadership are stigmatised as ‘nostalgia for the state of days gone by’6. The new 
reconstructed state must be equipped to operate “in multilevel non-territorial decision-
making networks that bring together governments, international agencies, non-
governmental organisations and so on” (Moore). When international gobbledegook like 
that is spouted, then you know you ought to be on your guard.  
 
If that is a rather extreme version of the case for externally driven reconstruction, others 
offers a more moderate approach. External leadership will allow the buffer for local 
actors to renew trust and confidence in themselves. Democracy and marketised 
economies do offer the best chances of guaranteeing long-term peace. However the new 
states or new governance arrangements must ensure the centrality of institutions that can 
regulate the transition to a marketised system. There must in effect be a partnership 
between local and international actors with oversight remaining in the hands of the 
international community until conditions are ripe for the return of the state to local actors. 
 
To my mind this debate is a reprise of debates from bye-gone days on the arguments for 
and against colonialism – mainly for, since the arguments against from recipients of 
                                                 
6 D. Moore (2000) Humanitarian agendas, state reconstruction and democratisation processes in war-torn 
societies; New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper 24, www.jha.ac/articles/u024.htm  
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empire didn’t get much of a hearing at the outset of empire – and the international 
mandate and trusteeship system established by the League of Nations in the 1920s and 
the UN system in the 1940s. Indeed some of the discussions on statebuilding do actually 
pose the issue of whether a formal system of international trusteeship should not be 
reinstituted for some countries in postconflict situations.  
 
It would be difficult to argue that the UN’s role in Timor Leste was anything other than 
that of an international trusteeship. Iraq’s sovereignty was held by the USA for a year or 
two after the invasion of 2003 and then formally returned to the government of Iraq. In 
Liberia, under specific agreements made between the postconflict government elected in 
2005 and the international community, the elected government accepted as the price for 
continued international aid and assistance a system of co-governance over national 
finances under which international administrators have to co-sign most of the 
authorisations of expenditure by the Liberian government. This is regarded as a great 
success by the international community so it can be assumed that it will become part of 
‘best practice’ in the future. Much of the debate about governance in Afghanistan is to 
my mind a coded one on how much ‘independence’ should the Karzai regime be allowed. 
 
3. Land and the liberal peace agenda 
 
What of land? There are probably more international guides to best practice on land than 
on any other aspect of statebuilding. After a slow start, international agencies have 
produced a plethora of such documents, noted in my presentation at a Birkbeck Law 
School staff seminar in January 2009. Then I was more or less convinced of the 
correctness of this approach and indeed was concerned in that seminar to try and advance 
it by arguing for the development an all-encompassing humanitarian land law.  
 
But on this I am having second thoughts. Many of the reports and guidelines and the 
Pinheiro Principles themselves make strong recommendations for a clear legal framework 
being the necessary precondition for programmes of restitution of property and housing 
which is a cornerstone of the Principles7. But a criticism of these guides and their 
                                                 
7 Leckie in his UNHCR paper is explicit in setting out what needs to be done: “One particular legislative 
action that may be considered…would be the pursuit of a Consolidated Housing Rights Law…[which] 
could provide the legal basis for land reform…”    
The ICTJ states: “Restitution programmes should set out clear rules balancing the rights of claimants 
against those of subsequent occupiers…” 
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recommendations to which I paid too little attention is that what is needed is “post-
conflict land policy which focuses on the political dynamics of the conflict over land 
rather than the technical dimensions of land administration” and this has been sidestepped 
by the guides and the Principles which have focused on the technical aspects of 
postconflict land administration.  In some respects indeed, it seems to me that in urging 
the restoration of the status quo ante, these principles and guides are in danger of 
recreating the very conditions that contributed to the collapse of the state. 
 
A paper by the Brooking Institution in June 2008 on Addressing Property Claims of the 
Displaced: Challenges to a Consistent Approach has the merit of highlighting three very 
different approaches to post-conflict property rights: the rights-based approach being 
developed by the UN system via international law and internationally developed 
institutions as in Bosnia and Kosovo; what might be called the national approach which 
tries to utilise existing national laws and institutions rather than trying to reinvent the 
wheel: the model offered here was Iraq; third, the approach that starts from the position 
that conflict will have had a profound effect on existing tenure systems so that it might be 
next to impossible to return to the pre-conflict position which is what in a sense the 
rights-based approach is geared to; one was inevitably going to be involved in rewriting 
rights: this is especially the position, it was argued, in African states with respect to 
customary tenure.  
                                                                                                                                                 
The IDMC, the offshoot of the NRC says in much the same language: “A clear and consistent legal 
framework is vital for restitution programmes to succeed…domestic legal analysis, repeal and reform 
should form a cornerstone of programmes designed to ensure the right to housing and property restitution.” 
The HPG of ODI’s conference noted the need to promote legislative reform. 
Finally, the Pineiro Principles are quite explicit on the need for clear national laws: “18.3 States should 
ensure the national legislation related to housing, land and property restitution are internally consistent…” 
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I think this analysis is very useful and certainly applicable to postconflict states in Africa. 
In several cases, the conflict, if not directly about land, certainly involved land and land 
lay behind what went on and goes on in the public eye. Jean-Philippe Platteau has made 
this point with respect to Rwanda. Land and the loss of it to foreign and Northern 
Sudanese investors lay behind the Nuba’s joining the Sudanese civil war on the side of 
the SPLM. The restoration of land to its original owners was a key element of the 
Chimurenga in Zimbabwe and still is. There is a great deal of evidence that land was an 
issue in Liberia’s and Sierra Leone’s civil wars and if land issues are not addressed in 
Liberia, may well trigger renewed fighting. The breakdown of the state in Cote d’Ivoire 
revolved around land and the ‘foreigners’ who had obtained rights in indigenes’ land. 
Land and who should have what rights to it was a major issue in the post-election 
outbreak of violence in Kenya in 2007 now the subject of proceedings before the ICC at 
The Hague. Nor should we forget that South Africa was in the early 1990s a postconflict 
state and that land was and remains a fundamental element of conflict within the state.     
 
One thing the Brookings analysis leaves out however is the ideology behind the 
international community’s increasing involvement in postconflict land administration. It 
seems to me that in placing a heavy emphasis on restitution of property, reform of land 
laws, and the resolution of conflicts over land, admirable though these matters are, taken 
singly, and placing them within a context of a rights-based approach, the international 
community is concerned to restore as quickly as possible a land management system that 
is a recognisable market-led one. People will regain clear rights to land, property and 
housing; a new and comprehensive land law will facilitate dealings with these property 
rights and an efficient and effective dispute settlement process will sort out any problems 
that may arise in this brave new postconflict world of a functioning land market: part of 
the LPA in other words.    
 
Of late a more fundamental criticism of the liberal peace agenda is beginning to be 
voiced which has not yet been applied to the land elements of that agenda. My current 
work could I suppose be seen as an attempt to see how far and in what way this critical 
approach to the LPA could be applied to postconflict land administration. The key term 
here and one that is constantly surfacing now in discussions is ‘transformation’. I can best 
illustrate this different approach or at least how I am interpreting it and using it by 
referring to the reports I have recently written on local government in Mogadishu, urban 
land management in Liberia and land issues in Somaliland. 
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4. Local government in Mogadishu8 
 
First Mogadishu. I was involved in 2007 in drafting a discussion paper on possible future 
local government in Mogadishu. The paper took the form of a host of questions that I 
considered needed addressing by those who were going to put together a Mogadishu City 
Charter (MCC) together with pointers drawn from other local government systems in 
Anglophone Africa of the pros and cons of different possible solutions. A workshop took 
place in that paper in Kampala9 with some 15 Somalis involved either in the past or in the 
present with the provision of local services and government issues in Mogadishu. I 
revised the paper in the light of the discussions that took place there. This year I was 
invited to a workshop in Nairobi to discuss a draft MCC. It bore little relationship to any 
issues that had been raised and discussed in the workshop of 200710. I had been doing 
some further reading about the current state of affairs in Somalia and that together with 
concerns about the LPA led me to write a critical note on the MCC to the UNDP Office 
on Somalia based in Nairobi. I reproduce it here more or less as drafted.  
 
The MCC is quite well drafted and covers most of the matters that a traditional local 
government law based on an English model should cover. It is however very repetitive on 
functions, powers and duties; some of the clauses overlap and need tidying up. The big 
gap is a total lack of provisions on administrative law, integrity systems and codes of 
                                                 
8 The internationally recognised ‘official’ government in Somalia is the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) established in 2007. It controls very little of Somalia. It is not clear how much of Mogadishu it 
controls. Mogadishu is in theory divided into 16 districts; one estimate I have heard is the TFG is confined 
to just one district in Mogadishu. UN agencies seem to operate in more than that one district so they are 
clearly co-operating with CBOs, NGOs, and various other ‘unofficial’ groups which provide services to the 
residents of Mogadishu. At present no UN officials can visit or are based in Mogadishu.  
9 The workshop took place in Kampala because there was no place in Somalia which the UN considered 
safe enough for a workshop to be held. It could not be held in Nairobi as the Somalia government has just 
issued new passports. The persons coming to the workshop only had old passports which the Government 
of Kenya refused to recognise. The Government of Uganda did recognise them however. Uganda had just 
agreed to spearhead the new AU peacekeeping force which was taking over from the Ethiopians who were 
retreating from their US supported invasion of Somalia. The Ugandan government thus had a vested 
interest in helping forward the process of reinstating a local government in Mogadishu. Earlier on in the 
consultancy I had visited Biadoa in Somalia where the TFG was based to interview officials about local 
government reform in Mogadishu. Interestingly, several key officials were most reluctant to become 
involved in the exercise. I then gave a presentation on my findings and very preliminary views at a 
workshop in Nairobi where many members of the TFG resided.  
10 The odd thing is that the document just arrived out of the blue. There was no indication as to who or what 
body had had a hand in drafting it or what its sources were. In his book The Law and the Constitution 
Dicey makes the point early on that Englishmen did not wake up one morning and find the Constitution 
fully grown. But this is what seems to have happened with the Mogadishu City Charter.  
 7
conduct for councillors and officials. There are no provisions on hearings and appeals 
against decisions by the authority adverse to the citizen, no provisions on any form of 
public involvement by the citizenry in the governance of Mogadishu; no provisions on 
internal audit or monitoring of the exercise of power and behaviour by officials and 
councillors. These are grave gaps in the law as they give the impression that the aim of 
the law is to acquire and use power over citizens rather than use powers in the service of 
and with the participation of the citizen. 
 
However the real issue is whether any such body should be established in Mogadishu. 
Basically the law provides for a rather old-fashioned approach to what local authorities 
should do and how they should do it. It is too top-heavy: it assumes the city council will 
do everything and regulate a lot of activities; will set and collect local taxes and will also 
set its own expenses and rates of allowances. Contacts with local communities and the 
delegation of functions to local communities and their organisations are absent. The 
citizen’s role is to do as he or she is told.  
 
This is in my view very much the wrong kind of local authority to establish in Somalia 
right now. There is a very great deal of evidence that in the absence of any kind of 
effective central or local government in Somalia and in Mogadishu, a very great number 
of organisations have come into being providing a range of services and public goods to 
the citizenry. These may be business people, community based organisations, traditional 
and religious organisations and bodies such as SAACID, the women’s group responsible 
for garbage collection, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration using a cross-clan 
community dialogue model. As one commentator has put it, economic progress and 
improved public goods in critical areas have flourished in the absence of a monopolistic 
and corrupt state. This commentator compares Somalia on 18 key indicators on a ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ the collapse of central government in 1991 basis and with 3 neighbouring 
states – Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia – and finds that Somalia after is much better than 
Somalia before and outscores the neighbouring states on 13 of the 18 indicators11.  
 
More pertinent is the evidence that on the whole Somalia has been pretty peaceful since 
1994 and that trade, particularly cross-border cattle trade with Kenya, has flourished. 
Foreign investors are coming in. The Somali shilling has been remarkably stable over the 
                                                 
11 Peter T. Leeson (nd but it is probably 2007) Better Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government 
Collapse, Department of Economics, West Virginia University. 
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last 19 years. When there has been violence, it has been more or less, no doubt 
inadvertently, led or stimulated by the international community – the internationally 
supported invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia, raids on Somalia to ‘root out’ al-Qaeda – and 
successive attempts to establish central governments with too little recognition that the 
Somali experience of central government had been a very unhappy one; that central 
government was seen almost universally as a predator, and something that, if one was not 
going to be able to capture it, one should oppose it vigorously and if necessary violently. 
One commentator has put it thus: “The critical point of the analysis of Somalia is that, in 
the absence of a central state, the result has not been widespread chaos. Instead, 
endogenous rules and mechanisms that allow individuals to “get things done” have 
developed and created widespread co-operation. This is even more evident when 
compared to the widespread conflict that resulted when foreign governments attempted to 
create a central state”.      
 
In these circumstances, an old fashioned local authority is the very last institution that 
should be set up. It has no resonance with the lived experience of Somalis. It will be seen 
as an institution that must be captured or opposed so that its resources can be used for the 
benefit of one group and against other groups. It is both highly significant and highly 
depressing that one of the few major changes made to the MCC during the workshop held 
on it in Mogadishu in December 2009 was to introduce an expanded list of the expenses 
that councillors would be entitled to claim. An MCC not part of the institutional 
arrangements that already exist or have developed over the last 15 or so years that 
provide some forms of governance and service provision to the residents of Mogadishu. 
Institutions are more than a set of rules, they are the result of a bargain between rulers 
and constituents. One needs to restore or support and affirm societal mechanisms, 
structures and communities rather than try to impose alien structures. 
 
Many commentators have made the point, not just in relation to Somalia, that what is 
needed in many postconflict societies and states is not the restoration of the state but the 
transformation of the state, not by tinkering with outside changes to institutions but by 
local ownership, participation, inclusion and consensus-building. The externally imposed 
liberal model of peacekeeping and statebuilding prevalent in relation to Somalia is 
increasingly being questioned. The matter has been put very well by Doe: 
 
Current approaches to state building, primarily dominated by the liberal 
peace thesis, tend to gloss over indigenous or organic mechanisms 
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rooted in the sociological, historical, political and environmental 
realities of postconflict contexts…Such universalised and ‘best practice’ 
approaches not only restore superficial states, they also extend the 
colonial project of undermining organic processes of state formation and 
state building. Indigenization stands as a complement to the liberal peace 
approach. Central to indigenization is the recognition of the role of 
emerging agencies and structures as part of the basis for recovery…12 
 
If we take this approach, what should a Mogadishu City Charter look like? The law 
should provide that the city council should do very little except negotiate with substate 
and nonstate actors to undertake various tasks. The MCC should work through local 
intermediaries which are doing the job already and not set up local statutory rivals to 
them. More effort should be made to involve indigenous authorities especially in keeping 
the peace. There should be much more decentralisation to localities and more recognition 
of cultural pluralism in Mogadishu. There should be greater reliance on the business 
community and civil society to provide services.  
 
Rather than try to act as a Western-style local authority, (which it will not for the 
foreseeable future have the funds to emulate) it should make it its business to engage in 
dialogue with the communities in Mogadishu, to craft new relationships between it and 
them. Perhaps it should initially be no more than a forum for dialogue about how to bring 
about peace and security in Mogadishu and who should take what actions to achieve this 
and then move on to discuss who could supply what services to whom.  Social interaction 
and exchange requires co-ordination between individuals. This is facilitated by trust-
enhancing institutions. Governments are assumed to be able to do that but Somalia shows 
that that need not be the case. The private sector has been innovative on this. The MCC 
should not try to take over this role. If it is to follow the mantra now common in 
humanitarian aid circles of ‘do no harm’ then it should do very little. 
 
The situation in Somalia now is very different to that in Somaliland which has been 
developing a city charter for Hargeisa13. Once fighting in Somaliland came to an end in 
                                                 
12 Samuel Gbaydee Doe (2009), (a development and reconciliation officer with UNDP in Sri Lanka but 
from his name almost certainly from West Africa), Indigenizing Postconflict State Reconstruction in 
Africa: A Conceptual Framework: 2 Africa Peace and Conflict Journal 1 – 16; synopsis, 1 
13 Based on a draft I prepared in 2003. There was a City wide workshop on the draft in December 2003 and 
since that date work has continued on the draft refining it in the light of the experiences in local 
government in Hargeisa. A draft City Charter is now (April 2010) before Parliament in Hargeisa. It has 
 10
1996, a central government was set up by the Somalilanders with the full agreement of all 
clans and groups. This central government has provided a reasonable modicum of peace 
and stability since then and on that basis, the government has moved slowly and carefully 
to develop a statutory system of local government for Hargeisa. This is based in part on a 
locally developed local government law already in existence, a draft law modelled on the 
types of local government existing in Anglophone East Africa (and familiar to some of 
the local councillors in Hargeisa who have lived in Anglophone countries and worked in 
local government there) but also, and probably more importantly, on the developing 
existing practices of local government actually being operated in Hargeisa and other local 
authorities in Somaliland.  
 
The model being suggested here for local government in Mogadishu in fact follows the 
Somaliland approach: agreement amongst traditional authorities to establish a 
government combining indigenous and imported institutions (but imported which were 
familiar to the political leaders); local government developed on the basis of practices 
again both indigenous and imported and only when these are seen to work quite well, 
moving to a statutory framework. To try and introduce – impose as it will be seen – a 
new law on local government in Mogadishu in current circumstances would be unwise. 
 
It is not surprising that this note was not distributed to delegates at the workshop on the 
draft MCC14. I argued for a modified version of it at the workshop stressing the existing 
role of NGOs, and CBOs in providing some services and urging a much less prominent 
role for any Mogadishu City Council and the need for principles of administrative justice 
to be embedded in the draft. I suggested that the concept of the Right to the City (see 
below) should be the guiding principle for drafting an MCC and for local government in 
Mogadishu. I think the Deputy Mayor of Mogadishu took the point as did representatives 
of CBOs at the workshop but other and more senior Somali officials seemed to want to 
                                                                                                                                                 
been drafted in Somali and not yet translated into English so I do not know what relationship it bears to the 
draft of 2003. 
14 The only comment I received from any official was one from a quite senior official in UN-Habitat ( 
which considers that it and not UNDP should be the agency working with the TFG on local government in 
Somalia) that it was always amazing how little attention officials paid to academic writings on the issues 
they were working on. However, the summary of the workshop prepared by UNDP does give some 
prominence to my views as presented to the workshop.  – impact! I had also drawn attention to a book just 
published in Nairobi: Public Law in East Africa which is a useful introduction to administrative law in the 
three East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda with some comparative material drawn from 
the UK and the Caribbean. I had the book with me. The legal adviser to the Mayor of Mogadishu asked me 
for details of the book so he could obtain it – a sign that the message about administrative justice might 
make some headway.  
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hark back to the old local government laws of Somalia15. The upshot was an agreement 
to establish a ‘Technical Team’ to revise the draft MCC to which I am to provide 
advice.16 The aim is to have an agreed draft of an MCC to present to the TFG by 
ecember 2010. 
 which 
ompletely failed to take account of the realities of land problems in Mogadishu. 
bble beneath the surface and an MCC 
lundering about will only make matters worse.     
                                                
D
 
This workshop was then followed up by an informal discussion in UN-Habitat between 
some of the Somali participants from the workshop and some senior Habitat officials on 
the issue of land management in Mogadishu. The debate centred round how the necessary 
information on the land situation in Mogadishu could be gathered together in Mogadishu 
and relayed to UN-Habitat so the agency could offer constructive comments on what 
might be done. The usual methods of collecting data were explained. This was a perfectly 
rational response to a request for assistance. It was, however, also a response
c
 
One of the key land issues in Mogadishu (I was aware of this but it was put to me quite 
forcefully in a break in the local government workshop by a delegate from a Mogadishu-
based NGO) is the strong feeling by the Hawiye clan who are located in and around 
Mogadishu that ‘their’ land should not be taken by non-Hawiye Somalis who want to 
come and live and work in Mogadishu as employees and beneficiaries of Mogadishu as 
the capital of Somalia. For the Hawiye, Mogadishu as the capital is a dis-benefit and in 
their eyes, they have been offered nothing to compensate them for the loss of control over 
their land and loss of the land itself For the TFG, land in Mogadishu as the capital of 
Somalia must be freely available to any Somali who wants to live and work there. This 
issue was not raised at the discussions but while it continues to be officially ignored, 
tension over land in Mogadishu will continue to bu
b
 
15 One enormous gap in the discussions at the workshop was finance: how was an MCC to be funded. Since 
records began to be kept for Somalia in 1905, the country’s internal financial resources have never kept 
pace with public expenditure that has always been subsidised either by the Italian colonial and later 
trusteeship authorities until 1960 and then by copious amounts of foreign aid until 1991. Somalis do not 
like paying taxes, understandably so since they get nothing in return and there is in any event little to tax.. 
See Mohamoud, op. cit., chap. 5. 
16 There was no clear indication at the workshop of what a technical team would do. It was however agreed 
that the Team should visit Djibouti where another group of Somalis – the Independent Federal 
Constitutional Committee (IFCC) is based to undertake the work of drawing up a revised federal 
constitution of Somalia. Since the workshop, it has been agreed with the IFCC that the technical team 
should become a sub-committee of the IFCC. The UNDP was all for sending me to Djibouti but I pointed 
out that if, as should certainly be the case, drafting and discussions on the draft are conducted in Somali, 
my role would be rather limited. No problem was the answer: an interpreter will be provided.   
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It is not as if there are no possible solutions There are two possibilities. One is the Fijian 
approach: non-native Fijians have restricted rights to occupy and use Fijian land and such 
land is managed by a Fijian Native Lands Trust Board on behalf of native Fijians. It is not 
a very admirable system as it introduces an element of ‘apartheid’ into land ownership 
and use in Fiji. But it might be a way to reassure the Hawiye that even if they cannot 
continue in exclusive occupation or control of all ‘their’ land, they can at least obtain 
some specific financial benefit from the loss of ‘their’ land. So land would not be 
compulsorily acquired from Hawiye land ‘owners’ but leased with the rents being paid 
into, e.g. a Hawiye Development Trust Fund administered by the Hawiye for the benefit 
f all Hawiye. 
s ensure failure for 
ny attempt to create a local government system for Mogadishu.    
. Land and urban governance in Monrovia 
                                                
o
 
The second way would be more complicated but be aimed to achieve the same end. In 
many systems of local government, where central government contributes to local 
finances via grants, the grants are given for specific purposes. In the case of the Hawiye 
in Mogadishu, it should not be impossible to arrive at some kind of weighted cost/benefit 
conclusions about the impact of the capital on the Hawiye. On the one hand, increased 
jobs, better services, facilities and infrastructure – health, education, roads etc.—more 
income flowing to Hawiye-owned and controlled businesses; on the other hand, loss of 
land, loss of control over land, loss of traditional ways of living, losing out on many 
services and facilities in competition with better educated and more wealthy Somalis 
coming to Mogadishu from elsewhere. If the costs exceed the benefits, then the Hawiye 
should be compensated for their losses from specific grants made by the TFG to either 
the Hawiye direct or to the MCC.  These suggestions may not be acceptable to either the 
Hawiye or the TFG but not addressing the problem will more of les
a
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I turn now to Liberia17.  My mission to Liberia took place in November 2009 to 
participate in the Orientation Programme for Land Commissioners of the newly 
 
17 S. Ellis (2008) The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension to an 
African Civil War.2nd ed. The book is a sombre picture of Liberia but well worth reading. It only goes up to 
the election of Charles Taylor as President of Liberia in the late 1990s so does not cover the last decade – 
more civil war, Taylor’s deposition, an internationally brokered  peace agreement and the election of Ellen 
Sirleaf-Johnson as President – apart from a brief introduction to the 2nd edition. But the underlying social 
construct called Liberia will not have changed in the last 10 years.    
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established Land Commission. My contribution at the orientation programme was an 
introduction to comparative African and other country experiences on dealing with 
informal urban settlements. I also wrote a report on the urban land and governance 
situation in Monrovia, the capital, and how it might be addressed using ideas from my 
presentation at the orientation programme. It was in this report that I developed ideas that 
may be seen as transformational and in doing so made use of ideas and approaches 
already in existence but not perhaps put forward in a postconflict land and housing 
ontext before. What follows is a very much shortened and edited version of my report. 
.1. The Urban Problematique in Monrovia 
here is no lack of basic evidence about the urban situation in Monrovia. 
stries 
f coordinated approach to local problems; 
 and 
d and unresolved conflicts over land 
wider ones on land tenure 
generally) to prevent violent conflict breaking out again; 
a may be 
uoted here as they are arguably relevant to Liberia and Monrovia in particular: 
mandates, structures and functions…of local government…Good 
c
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• the legal framework of urban local governance is out of date, geared very much to a 
centralised approach to local governance – deconcentration at best as opposed to 
devolution – and even at the centre is split between several different Mini
which operates to prevent any kind o
• urban planning laws are out of date; 
• the majority of the urban population live in unplanned, informal and ‘illegal’ 
settlements, either on public land or privately owned land, are extremely poor
live in extremely poor quality accommodation; they have no security of tenure; 
• much of the urban infrastructure has been destroyed in the course of the civil wars; 
• Liberia is still in a post-conflict situation with all the special land issues to which 
such a situation gives rise; in particular continue
– who has the better right to occupy what land; 
• there is an urgent need to address these problems (and 
 
Two key policy approaches which informed a Habitat Country Report on Liberi
q
 
• A profound re-conceptualisation of the role of the urban sector is the most 
likely solution…this re-conceptualisation could have an immense impact on 
institutional and governance structures and the systems that regulate 
them…Interventions should include a redefinition and refocusing of 
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governance encourages the participation of local populations in the 
decision-making process that affects their welfare and well-being… 
• Land problems are emerging as a matter of urgency… The urbanisation 
process has been unregulated, haphazard and chaotic resulting in the 
increase in demand for land, shelter and delivery of basic 
services…Consequently, land administration and management issues are 
now impacting on the peace. As a result, there is an urgent and 
institutional challenge to strengthen security of tenure issues. 
 
These policy prescriptions inform what follows. 
 
5.2. The Right to the City: towards a transformed urban future for Liberia 
 
A “profound re-conceptualisation of the role of the urban sector” can best be brought 
about by adopting policies and laws based on The Right to the City: a right for all in the 
city to be there; to have or acquire secure tenure to their homes (particularly the absence 
of arbitrary evictions); to participate in the processes of urban governance and in 
particular in the planning and financial management of their local areas; to have uniform 
standards of administrative justice applied to them by officials; and to have uniform 
access to dispute settlement fora and processes to assist them to resolve their land and 
other disputes peaceably and justly. 
 
The Right to the City is a conceptualisation of the messages of the Habitat Agenda and 
the Global Plan of Action as later developed and elaborated in the Global Campaigns on 
Urban Governance and on Secure Tenure for the Urban Poor. In national policy and legal 
terms, it can most clearly be seen in Brazil’s City Statute of 2001; Turkey’s Law on 
Informal Settlements (which dates from 1966), and its 2007 Urban Transformation Law 
and in the South African Development Facilitation Act 1996 (since repealed and replaced 
by provincial urban planning laws). Briefly, commentators have summarised the 2001 
Brazilian and 2007 Turkish laws as follows:     
 
The City Statute has four main dimensions, namely a conceptual one, 
providing elements for the interpretation of the constitutional principle 
of the social function of urban property and of the city; the regulation of 
new legal, urbanistic and financial instruments for the construction and 
financing of a different urban order by the municipalities; the indication 
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of processes for the democratic management of cities; and the 
identification of legal instruments for the comprehensive regularization 
of informal settlements in private and public urban areas…18 
 
The intended Law empowers the municipalities in the designation of several 
types of special planning areas for the purposes of implementing projects 
concerning protection, regeneration, intensive development, and public 
and/or private investments…They are entitled to determine the location and 
size of areas for such operations, prepare plans and projects. 
The municipality or the majority of the property owners in an area could 
form partnerships for the redevelopment and/or joint management of the 
area. Besides physical operations of clearance, development, protection, 
such projects are envisaged to cover policies of finance, management, 
ownership and means of socio-economic development. Protecting the rights 
of the original owners, the municipalities in these areas could carry out lease 
agreements, servitudes, comprehensive project development…19 
 
Key elements of South Africa’s Development Facilitation Act 1996 which set out 
General Principles of Land Development which applied throughout the country; and 
enshrined a new approach to planning law provided, inter alia, that: 
 
• Policy, administrative practice and law should…facilitate the development 
of formal and informal, existing and new settlements…; 
• Policy, administrative practice and law should promote efficient and 
integrated land development;  
• Members of communities affected by land development should actively 
participate in the process of land development…; 
• Laws, procedures and administrative practice relating to land development 
should –  
o be clear and generally available to those likely to be affected 
thereby; 
                                                 
18 E. Fernandes (2007) Constructing the ‘Right to the City’ in Brazil, 16 Social and Legal Studies, 201 – 
221, 212. See too C.S. Carvahlo and A. Rossbach (2010) The City Statute of Brazil: A Commentary, Sao 
Paulo, Cities Alliance and Brazil Ministry of Cities. 
19 A. Ulu, (2007) Regeneration of Urban Areas in Cities of Turkey: Case Study: Izmit, Conference on 
Sustainable Urban Areas, Rotterdam, June 25 – 28. 
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o be calculated to promote trust and acceptance on the part of those 
likely to be affected thereby; 
o land development should result in security of tenure, provide for 
the widest possible range of tenure alternatives, including 
individual and communal tenure, and in cases where land 
development takes the form of upgrading an existing settlement, 
not deprive beneficial occupiers20 of homes or land or, where it 
is necessary for land or homes occupied by them to be utilised 
for other purposes, their interests in such land or homes should 
be reasonably accommodated in some other manner…; 
                                                
 
Applying these principles to Liberia would involve a total recasting of laws on local 
government and urban planning, a review and probable fundamental revision of the law 
relating to compulsory acquisition of land, alterations to the law on prescription 
(acquisition of land rights based on open, peaceable and continuous occupation of land 
for a specified period), and a moratorium on evictions of ‘squatters’21.  
 
But that is not all. More important, perhaps than changes in the law, adoption and 
enactment of these principles would involve a total transformation of the administrative 
and land tenure cultures of Liberia: in one fell swoop, every citizen would be entitled to 
own his or her own home; to be involved in the governance of their local area above and 
beyond voting every now and again for their representatives; and to be treated fairly and 
with respect by all officials. That is what is involved in a re-conceptualisation of urban 
governance and land management.. 
 
5.3. Urban local governance 
 
The Right to the City goes beyond land issues. It is first and foremost a statement of the 
requirement of a participative approach to governance within urban areas. It involves not 
 
20 “beneficial occupier” means in relation to the occupation of land in a land development area where land 
development takes the form of upgrading an existing settlement, any person who has been in peaceful and 
undisturbed occupation of such land for a continuous period of not less than five years.” Section 1 DFA 
21 A rigid application of a restitution approach to urban land problems in Monrovia would see thousands of 
squatters removed from land privately owned by some of the large landowners in Monrovia. Liberia has a 
land policy and land practices not dissimilar to apartheid South Africa: Americano-Liberians have rights to 
own land denied to rural ‘natives’ on the basis of laws dating from the 19th century (the latest of these laws 
is a 1956 law which permits ‘civilised natives’ to own land) including acquiring freehold ownership of land 
in rural areas occupied by ‘natives’ on the basis of Presidential grants.  
 17
just devolution from the centre to a local authority; in large urban areas such as 
Monrovia, it involves the creation and empowerment of local area councils, so bringing 
governance to the people. An example may be given: the one tier City Council of Dar es 
Salaam – a city of some 3 million inhabitants – was reorganised in the 1990s into a three 
tier system: the City Council; 3 municipal councils and 70 ward councils. The principal 
operational level is the municipal council but ward councils do have some important 
powers and bring local government down to a more human level. The legal framework of 
urban local government in Tanzania is a fairly standard Anglophone model dating from 
the early 1980s and would need its own revamping were that country to adopt a Right to 
the City approach to urban governance but the 3 tier structure is a step in the right 
direction of bringing governance to the people.  
 
In the case of Monrovia, the only urban local authority large enough to warrant the 
creation of a multi-tiered structure, a two tier system might be sufficient, provided the 
second and lower tier authorities were of a size that would be accessible for the citizen 
and effective in the delivery of services: ideally between 6 and 8 lower tier authorities 
should be created. If this would likely strain capacity, then the City Council should adopt 
a programme of establishing area offices with their own budgets and delegate functions 
to such offices. In time these area offices could become the lower tier councils.    
 
The Right to the City is a broad and general policy statement. It offers a new way forward 
for urban governance and urban land management. In the context of Liberia, these two 
areas of concern are inseparable. What must now be concentrated on is the detailed 
content of the rights which involves a discussion of the possible contents of the laws 
which would be needed to give practical effect to the rights. There are, it is suggested, 
two basic laws – one providing for a new approach to urban local government, the other, 
providing for a new approach to urban land management.  
  
If the Right to the City were to form the basis of any new law to provide for a re-
conceptualised approach to local government in Monrovia, then at the forefront of the 
law would be a statement of the rights and responsibilities of the residents of the city 
towards each other and the wider community of the city and of the local authority 
towards its residents. The following is a possible formulation of such rights and 
responsibilities: 
 
Rights of the citizen:  
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• to participate both individually and collectively via associations of their own making 
in urban governance through processes of participatory budgeting, participatory 
planning, local referendums, popular initiatives and public private partnerships; 
• to obtain information from the public authorities necessary to be able to exercise the 
above rights; 
• to live in a safe, secure and healthy environment; 
• to obtain equitable and affordable access to basic urban services and facilities of land 
with secure tenure, potable water, waste disposal and electricity; 
• to receive all services respectfully, impartially, efficiently, and timeously;  
• to be treated in accordance with principles of administrative justice; 
• not to be evicted arbitrarily from where he or she is living; 
• to have access to processes of conflict resolution and dispute settlement with respect 
to disputes over rights to property, land and housing; 
• to object to any decision or action of the council or an officer of the council on 
grounds of illegality, abuse of power, corrupt practices or disproportionality and to 
have that decision or action reviewed and, if necessary, set aside by an impartial 
body.  
 
Obligations of the citizen 
• to pay local taxes levied in accordance with the law; 
• to comply with all lawful requirements of the council, its councillors and officers; 
• to live at peace with his and her neighbours; 
• to take all reasonable steps to diffuse tensions and settle disputes arising locally; and 
• to co-operate with others in maintaining a safe, secure and healthy environment 
within the immediate neighbourhood.    
  
Primary duty of local authorities within Monrovia 
(1) The city council shall have as its primary duty the provisions of a forum for the 
discussion by organisations and bodies representing all elements of civil society of the 
ways and means of governance, and the provision of services to the citizenry, in 
Monrovia; the taking of such actions and the performing of such functions including 
contracting out to and facilitating other persons to take such actions and perform such 
functions as will achieve any one or more of the following objectives within the area of 
the city for the benefit of all or any part of the residents of the city –  
(a) the promotion and improvement of peace, security and stability; 
(b) the promotion and operation of open and participative government;  
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(c) the promotion and improvement of economic, social and environmental 
well-being, habitations and living conditions; 
(d) the regularisation and improvement of informal settlements; 
(e) the facilitation of the settlement of disputes over property, land and 
housing issues. 
 
(2) The taking of any such actions and the performance of any such functions as are 
referred to in subsection (1) shall comply with the principles of administrative justice.    
 
(3)  Where any actions or functions are being provided by any institution of civil 
society or through the operation of bodies functioning in the private sector, then the city 
council shall liaise with such institutions and bodies and assist them to carry out those 
functions so as the better to meet the principles set out in subsection (1).    
 
It is important to make the point that these rights and obligations will not stand alone as 
an add-on to existing local government laws: they will drive the rewriting of those laws 
so as to give effect to them. To give just one illustration, setting the local authority budget 
will cease to be the preserve of officers and councillors alone with ultimate reference 
upwards to central government. Participatory budgeting involves local communities via 
their organisations working with officers of local authorities, setting goals, determining 
spending priorities, allocating, spending and accounting for funds. It reverses the normal 
budgetary process which is a top-down one. It will involve central government no less 
than local authorities ‘letting go’ This would need to be provided for by law. 
 
5.4. Urban land management 
 
When it comes to dealing with the land question in post-conflict states, the two principal 
institutions that need to be rebuilt and supported are local governments and dispute 
settlement bodies. Central government and its offshoots, e.g. the Land Commission, can 
and should make policy, enact the necessary laws to give effect to policies, access finance 
and technical expertise from the international community (and from the diaspora) but the 
day-to-day business of dealing with people and their land problems – restitution, 
resettlement, the rapid growth of informal settlements,  disputes over land etc – fall to 
local authorities and local judicial institutions. These front-line institutions need to be 
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revived, rebuilt and reorientated as quickly as possible to tackle the urban land problems 
in Liberia22. 
 
When undertaking a mission for UN-Habitat in Afghanistan in 2005 reviewing both 
urban governance and urban land issues with suggestions for reforms, I wrote a short note 
entitled Urban Land Problems: Present Problems: Future Directions. Revisiting that note 
I am struck by the aptness of many of its general points for the situation in Liberia. I 
make no apology therefore for quoting it here: (words in [ ] are added to or substituted for 
those in the original): 
 
Cities are the engines of economic growth and the potential seed-bed of 
disaffection. Both positive and negative aspects of cities and their development 
involve getting land policies and land management right. The role and duty of 
governments is to create the conditions for the efficient and equitable provision of  
• access of all citizens to land;  
• secure tenure for those on the land 
• transparent and user-friendly processes for land transactions 
• urban land use plans to ensure optimal use of land and capital 
• [fair processes and procedures for land acquisition and compensation] 
• accessible and cost-effective systems of dispute settlement 
……               
What needs to be done 
 
Law is a necessary but by no means a sufficient input into better urban land 
policies. To the extent that good laws can help and bad laws can hinder the 
realisation of more equitable and efficient pro-poor and pro-market land policies 
and practices, the following sets out the range of legal reforms that are needed and 
the reasons for same: 
 
• the needs of the thousands of mainly poor residents of cities and towns living 
in planned and unplanned settlements and having very insecure rights to the 
land they are living on must be recognised and addressed in a positive way – 
acceptance and assistance rather than denial and demolition must be the way 
forward. This will involve developing and legislating for 
o determining who has what rights to what land  
                                                 
22 Very oddly, one might think, there has been little thinking or writing at an official or even unofficial 
level on local government in a postconflict state. One of the few ‘official’ documents is the UNDP/Oslo 
Governance Centre (2007) Report of a Workshop on Local Government in Post-Conflict Situations: 
Challenges for Improving Local Decision Making and Service Delivery Capacities. This report did not 
seem to be known to the UNDP officials working on the MCC and local government generally in Somalia 
and Somaliland. Of the first 76 articles in the new Journal of Conflict and Peacebuilding, founded in 2004, 
only 2 are on local government.   
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o graduated systems of secure rights to occupy housing for urban 
residents 
o arrangements for the transfer, with or without payment, of title to 
[public] land to urban residents granted secure title to their homes 
o community systems of recording of interests in a locally kept register  
• urban planning likewise must start from the reality of cities and towns as they 
are now rather than from an ideal blueprint…and begin a process of working 
with communities to improve and upgrade their environments out of which 
can grow a bottom-up approach to the development of new city-wide urban 
development plans. This will involve developing and or legislating for 
o  programmes to re-arrange land boundaries and plot sizes and shapes to 
facilitate providing [and upgrading] infrastructure and community 
facilities 
o small-scale removal and relocation of some housing with 
compensation  
o a new urban planning law based on the principles of participation, 
integrated development planning, facilitation of planned development 
of land, limited and focused ‘development control’ (requirement of 
permission to develop) 
• land markets must be facilitated but as with any properly managed land 
management system, they must also be regulated in the interests of efficiency, 
effectiveness and equity: transparency and due process must be the keys here. 
This will involve developing and or legislating for 
o the separation of the governmental functions of allocating land from 
that of regulating the operations of the market for land; 
o setting out transparent systems for public sector land allocation, 
compliance with terms and conditions of government leases [and 
grants] and for revocation of leases, [grants] and other governmental 
land rights  
o a regulatory impact analysis of the existing procedures and processes 
for land transactions with a view to their revision and reduction… 
o accessible and cost-effective systems of dispute settlement. 
 
How can all these requirements be provided for? There must be a prioritisation of what 
must be done. The whole area of land markets and their regulation necessarily involves a 
thorough review of existing law – statutes and case law – and practices and reform is a 
more long-term exercise which is not essential to meet the immediate needs of post-
conflict urban land management. 
 
This leaves urban tenure reform and urban planning and land development reform. The 
most pressing problem is unquestionably that of informal settlements, the socio-economic 
conditions therein and political implications of not addressing these conditions. These can 
best be provided by an urban transformation law. The remainder of this report explains 
and elaborates on the ideas behind and the possible contents of such a law.    
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5.5. Towards an Urban Transformation Act  
 
5.5.1 Basic legal and other deficiencies of informal settlements 
 
The first step is to summarise the principal deficiencies of informal settlements which a 
law on transformation, regularisation and regeneration might be expected to deal with. 
The concern here is with deficiencies on which action on and about land and buildings 
could be designed to bring about improvements. Principal deficiencies are – 
  
• lack of a formal title to land which limits the possibility of obtaining loans to 
improve accommodation or to get started in or improve a commercial enterprise and 
might also limit the amount of compensation payable on expropriation; 
• continuing post-conflict disputes between different groups of or individual returnees 
and current occupiers who may be IDPs on who is the ‘rightful’ occupier of land; 
• continuing disputes between private landowners and ‘squatters’ whom the former 
want off their land;  
• buildings built without planning and or building control permission; 
• irregularly shaped plots of land which limit the kind of building that can be built on 
them and the services that can be supplied to them; 
• buildings often built very close to each other which again limits services which can 
be supplied to residents; 
• hazardous land – slopes, river beds, marshy land, contaminated land, land too close 
to roads – is used for the building of houses etc; 
• where public land is used for settlements, the ever present possibility of eviction 
without compensation since it is difficult to obtain a title of ownership by long use 
over public land; 
• exploitation of residents by large-scale landowners renting out property outside the 
scope of any laws providing for some balancing of rights and obligations between 
landlords and tenants; 
• lack of full public services; 
• lack of investment in the settlements (other than from the residents) which could 
improve the economic and commercial prospects of the settlements ; 
• the difficulties that may be faced by residents in sorting out property, land and 
housing disputes where formal courts may not accept or apply the ‘informal’ laws 
that exist within settlements; and informal dispute settlement bodies have no 
mechanism to ensure that their decisions are complied with. 
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It is not suggested that all informal settlements in Liberia suffer from all these 
deficiencies; or that all these deficiencies are present all the time in informal settlements. 
But the above list does give a broad overview of problems affecting many informal 
settlements that need to be addressed in any law which aims to be comprehensive. 
 
5.5.2 Towards a transformational approach to informal settlements 
 
The terms which are increasingly being used in other countries faced either with similar 
problems of informal settlements or with their own set of problems of run-down inner 
city areas are ‘regeneration’ or ‘transformation’: both aiming to suggest that the aim of 
policy (and any accompanying law with the same name) is to rejuvenate, revitalise and 
renovate the designated area. This is significant for both terms are accepting that the area 
and its inhabitants will remain in being but need public support to improve their situation 
and circumstances. Two Turkish authors have explained transformation as follows: 
 
Transformation can be defined as ‘a comprehensive and integrated vision and 
action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to 
bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and 
environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change’. [italics 
added] Urban transformation interventions may vary according to the problems 
of localities. Some may aim to revitalise a declining activity, or a social 
function; to encourage social integration in the areas suffering from social 
exclusion; and/or to return the environmental and ecological deprivation back 
to a balanced level, while others may aim to regularize squatter areas and 
illegal urban developments, and to redevelop urban areas where standards of 
quality of life are highly low compared to other parts of the city. Therefore, 
urban transformation interventions need to have a deep and multifaceted 
understanding of the processes and sources of urban problems…(Egercioğlu 
and Őzdemir, 2007) 
 
This broad definition by these authors is apposite. Turkey has prepared an Urban 
Transformation Law to provide legal backing for a more holistic approach to dealing with 
gecekondus. (informal settlements).  
 
The intention behind such laws is clear: regeneration or transformation goes well beyond 
just tinkering with land use on a piecemeal basis and seeks to facilitate wholesale change 
and improvement in the areas subject to regeneration or transformation. Furthermore, 
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such laws make clear that a local authority or a statutory body is empowered to take an 
active role in bringing about improvements either on its own or in partnership with “other 
persons”: these could be persons from the areas or from outside. So public/private 
partnerships are a crucial dimension to regeneration and transformation.  
 
The Turkish law focuses its initial attention on land issues: that is the entry into 
regeneration and transformation. Ulu makes that clear in his description of the Urban 
Transformation Law. Land provides the point of entry but once in, public agencies may 
take on a variety of other functions. This then is the most striking and important 
difference between a traditional approach to informal settlements and a transformational 
approach: the traditional approach begins and ends with land: a transformational 
approach uses land as a way in to transform the social and economic conditions of the 
people living in informal settlements. 
 
Since the submission of my report to the UN-Habitat Office in Liberia in December 
2009, there has been no reaction. The officials in the Habitat office liked it and made 
clear their hope that I would be available to return to assist with acceptance and 
implementation of the report. One can only speculate as to why so far there seems to 
have been no positive reaction on the Liberian side. There can be no doubt that a 
transformational approach to the current urban situation in Liberia would threaten large 
landowners and even after the traumas of the civil wars of 1990 – 2005, Americano-
Liberians who make up most of the large landowning class still retain a lot of political 
and most of the economic power in the country. Given the very clear recognition that 
land issues played a part in the civil wars it might seem astonishing that the ‘reformist’ 
government of President Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson which took office in 2005 has done 
nothing to rectify the ‘apartheid’ style land policies and laws which she inherited. But the 
donor community, aka the USA, in other respects more or less running the government, 
has not brought any pressure on the government to reform the land laws and the present 
laws do certainly facilitate the continued granting of large land concessions to foreign 
investors. In other words a transformational approach to land relations runs up against the 
LPA whereas current Liberian land policies are foursquare within the LPA.23      
                                                 
23 Two other possible reasons for inaction are, first, that the senior UN-Habitat official proceeded on 
maternity leave shortly after she arrived and her successor is still getting into the job, neither having had 
any involvement with Liberia before their appointments. Second, the Land Commission, appointed by the 
President in October 2009 to get to grips with the land issue, seems pretty moribund. (private 
communication). That second reason would however chime in with a deliberate policy of inaction on land 
matters.  
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6.  Somaliland24  
   
A key message from Doe’s paper25 is that there is a need “for a return to the dialogue of 
indigenizing postconflict state rebuilding, especially in Africa” 
 
“indigeneity” as used here refers to institutions, mechanisms and 
practices predating colonialism and the Westphalian state that draws its 
roots from the sociological, historical, demographic, environmental and 
geographical context in which they exist…Beatrice Pouligny26 has 
argued that all “societies have at their disposal social modes of 
regulation and resources able to serve as a basis for reconstruction and 
recovery. 
Indigenization is not the same as endogenization in that it does not 
preclude the role of outsiders. The key here is that indigenization, the 
materials and structures are organic, with outsiders acting as a type of 
catalyst… 
                                                                                                                                                 
It may also be pointed out that in my report I had quoted the relevant section in the 1996 Constitution of 
Uganda which had conferred ownership rights on all those persons occupying land under customary tenure 
who up to that point were in law tenants at will of the state – the single most transformative action – 
postconflict or otherwise – any government in Africa has taken with respect to persons occupying land 
under customary tenure. This action was a direct result of promises President Museveni made to peasants 
when he was fighting the Obote 2 regime in the early 1980s in the bush. Suggesting that all peasants in 
Liberia should at the stroke of a pen receive freehold ownership of their land was not calculated to garner 
much support in Liberian governing circles. 
An equally if not more challenging transformational approach to land issues in Liberia was put forward by 
Liz Alden Wily (2007) in So owns the Forest in Liberia? An investigation into forest ownership and 
customary land rights in Liberia, SDI Liberia and FERN which developed clear recommendations towards 
solving potential conflicts over natural resources and suggested that Liberia could set a precedent by 
returning ownership of land to communities which would lead to improved forest governance, control of 
illegal logging and remedial action against historical injustices. That too has not been acted upon. Forests 
are very big business in Liberia both for foreign investors and for the Americano-Liberian elite. 
Community forestry is a pretty common phenomenon in many African countries. 
24 M. Bradbury (2008) Becoming Somaliland for a good overview and analysis of the birth of the new state; 
B. Poore (2009) Somaliland: Shackled to a Failed State, Stanford Journal of International Law, 117 – 150, 
a thorough analysis of the case for international recognition; J. Caplin (2009) Failing the State: 
Recognizing Somaliland, 30 Harvard International Review, 9 – 10, a useful overview of the case for 
recognition; S Kaplan (2008) The Remarkable Story of Somaliland, 19 Journal of Democracy, 143 – 157; 
an enthusiastic encomium for Somaliland and its forms of governance. I agree with much of Kaplan’s 
analysis but did not come across the article until preparing this paper in April 2010.  
25 op. cit., footnote 11 
26 B. Pouligny (nd given in Doe’s reference) Building peace after mass crimes, in Newman and Schnabel 
Recovering from Civil Conflict, 202 – 21. 
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Indigenization argues that the focus of state building must be 
comprehensive – engaging the political, sociological and technological 
dimensions of rebuilding authority, institutions and community. It also 
proposes that the overall aim of state reconstruction should be state 
transformation, rather than state restoration, with all emerging 
institutions drawing their roots from the post-collapse context. 
In such cases, transformation basically refers to a qualitative change in 
the structures, ideologies and networks of relationships… 
Patrick O’Halloran27 asserts that the current internationally led state 
reconstruction practice, confined to rational thinking, assumes that states 
can be restored by modifying their institutions and increasing material 
incentives for them…[but]…state building is also about society building. 
It therefore cannot be divorced from constructing the ideas on which a 
society must craft a state system…28  
 
These are very ambitious requirements and taken at their face value are probably 
impossible to realise. But one political entity – Somaliland – has good claims to be seen 
as having made a real effort to adopt an indigenising transformational approach to 
statebuilding and is worth discussing.  
 
During 2003, I was in Somaliland on a UN-Habitat project working with the Mayor and 
councillors of Hargeisa to develop a new local government law for the city.29 Somaliland 
                                                 
27 P. O’Halloran (1998) The role of identity in post-conflict multiethnic state-building: The case of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the Dayton Accord, www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2009/04/ohalloran98.pdf  
28 Ibid., 8, 11, 14, 15. 
29 The EU, to its great credit, then provided the bulk of the aid to the geographical area of Somalia and 
disbursed it through other agencies such as UN-Habitat. Neither the EU not the UN recognise Somaliland 
but their officials increasingly deal with reality on the ground. So does the British Government. On my first 
mission in July 2003, the first person I met in Hargeisa was an official from the British High Commission 
in Kenya, whom I happened to know, who was in Hargeisa with two senior officials from the Immigration 
Service in the UK to negotiate with officials in the (non-existent) government of Somaliland on a 
programme for the involuntary repatriation of Somalilander refugees and others from  the UK to 
Somaliland. This sounds pretty drastic but it must be conceded that there was at the time a heavy two-way 
traffic between the UK and Somaliland (Daallo Airlines, a Somaliland airline based in Djibouti and using at 
least from Dubai, Iluyshin-18 planes, then flew from London Gatwick to Hargeisa via Djibouti) with 
refugees going out to Somaliland for their holidays and on business. DFID does now provide some aid and 
assistance to Somaliland; police and security and the library of the University of Hargeisa. The biggest 
practical difficulty in not recognising Somaliland is over IDPs and refugees. For the UN all displaced 
Somalis are IDPs; for the Government of Somaliland, persons coming from Somalia are refugees and not 
entitled to the same rights as IDPs. 
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is not Somalia. A brief introduction to the country and its developmental trajectory to the 
present is in order.30  
 
Somaliland became a British protectorate in 1887. It was never particularly well regarded 
by the British nor did it benefit from much development assistance during its 
dependency. Law and order – the first concern of a colonial power – were not fully 
established until the early 1920s31.  
  
Somaliland was granted its independence by Britain on 26 June 1960. Five days later, it 
voluntarily and, at the time enthusiastically, voted to merge its independence with the 
newly created Somali Republic which came into being on 1 July 196032. After a 
promising beginning, the Republic of Somalia succumbed to a military coup in 1969 and 
one of the most ruthless and vicious dictators to emerge in Africa took control of Somalia 
– Siad Barre. Despite (or perhaps because of) his record of tyranny, of demonstrating that 
he was a ‘strong ruler’, he received large amounts of aid from the USA, happy that in the 
late 1970s, he fell out with his former paymaster, the USSR, over his war with Ethiopia. 
Eventually, the Somalis rose up against Barre and taking the lead in this in the late 1980s 
were the Somalis from the North-West, the old Somaliland, who had become increasingly 
disenchanted with the discrimination practiced against them by Southern Somali 
dominated governments. 
 
The reaction of Barre towards the Northern Somalis was immediate and horrendous. He 
set out to slaughter as many of them as possible and destroy their towns. Hargeisa, the 
largest town in the North-West was bombed by Barre’s air force based in Hargeisa and 
shelled by his army. Enormous destruction and loss of life took place. Over 50,000 
                                                 
30 The information for this very potted history is taken from Ioan Lewis’s magisterial A Modern History of 
the Somali; Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, 4th ed, London and Hargeisa, 2002. However it must be 
noted that many Somali scholars dispute Lewis’s emphasis on the importance of clans in the public life of 
Somalia. See too the more recent and very perceptive (in my view) Abdullah A. Mohamoud (2006) State 
Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa: The Case of Somalia (1960 – 2001) West Lafayette, 
Purdue University Press. 
31 Jardine, D. (1923) The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, London. In those days, any one who opposed colonial 
rule was regarded as mad; nowadays, they are regarded and treated as terrorists. Mohamoud sums up the 
colonial position thus: “…the task of the colonial state administration was to ensure the subordinate 
induction of the livestock economy into global trade…In this respect the British colonial administration 
undertook two chief functions essential to the material benefits of the colonial government. One was to 
keep peaceful the coastal towns through which the livestock was shipped to external markets; and the 
second was to prevent any disturbances  that might jeopardise the safety of the caravan routes which link 
the hinterland to the coastal enclaves.” Op. cit., 60.  
32 Cotran, E. (1963) Legal Problems Arising  out of the Formation of the Somali Republic, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 12, pp. 1010 – 1026. 
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people lost their lives; countless others were injured and lost their homes and all their 
possessions. Eventually the people triumphed; Barre and his forces were expelled from 
the North-West and at the beginning of 1991, Barre was chased away from Somalia.  
 
The people of the North-West had had enough. In May, 1991, at a conference of the 
Somaliland Communities at Burao, they reaffirmed their independence with effect from 
18th May.33 From that time onwards, Somaliland has regarded itself as an independent 
state and the citizens of that state have set about the process of rebuilding their state and 
nation. Without any recognition from any other state in the world community, and relying 
overwhelmingly on their own resources, and on remittances from the diaspora of 
Somalilanders which now amount of some $450 million a year, they are doing a 
remarkable job.  
 
It has not been easy. For the first few years, warlords both within Somaliland and from 
outside were a constant threat. But the government persevered. Gunmen have been 
disarmed. Now only the police in Hargeisa carry weapons. Peace and security have been 
restored more or less throughout the land. Only a border dispute with Puntland34 – 
another unrecognized breakaway state in the North-East of Somalia – threatens the 
peace35. As one statistic of the astonishing transformation which has been brought about, 
14 years ago at the height of the civil war and general lawlessness, Hargeisa shrank to 
around 10,000 inhabitants36. Today it has a population of over half a million and while 
there is much poverty, there is little crime in the city.  
 
A constitution has been adopted which provides for a President, a two chamber 
Parliament the second chamber being an appointed house of traditional elders, a Bill of 
Rights and an independent judiciary. The first President was Mohamed Egal, the leader 
of Somaliland at independence in 1960. When he died in 2002, it was widely assumed 
both within and outwith Somaliland that conflict would break out over the succession. It 
                                                 
33 The referendum that confirmed this declaration produced a larger majority for independence than that 
held in East Timor. It was declared by international observers (including some unofficial ones from the 
USA) to be free and fair. See generally, I. Jhazbhay, Somaliland: Africa’s best kept secret; A challenge to 
the international community? (2003) 12 African Security Review, 79.  
34 Puntland regards itself as a constituent state within a Federal Somalia. However it has few dealings with 
the TFG. 
35 Of late however there have been some kidnappings and killings within Somaliland almost certainly 
orchestrated by al-Shaabab, an Islamic group fighting the TFG in Somalia. Many of the leaders of al-
Shaabab come from Somaliland. 
36 I was shown photographs of Hargeisa as it was in 1991. Barely a single house had a roof on it. All have 
now been rebuilt. 
 29
did not. By the evening of the day of Egal’s death, Somaliland had a new President; the 
Vice-President was elevated to the post. Presidential elections were held the following 
year and when the result was disputed by the opposition who had lost by a mere 80 votes 
in a nation-wide poll, the matter was resolved peaceably by the elders. Local 
governments have been re-established, local elections held, services are beginning to be 
provided to the people and local taxes collected. Disputes are for the most part being 
settled peaceably although there is still grave problems of conflict between pastoralists 
and those who have grabbed communal pastoral land and enclosed it, claiming private 
ownership. 
 
Colonial Somaliland was part of the common law system. Appeals from the Somaliland 
High Court went to the Court of Appeal for East Africa which also exercised appellate 
jurisdiction in Kenya, Tanganyika (as it was until 1964), Uganda and Zanzibar. When 
Somaliland joined up with Somalia, a major exercise in ‘legal integration’ commenced 
managed by an Italian team37. It would not be entirely unfair to say that the integration 
consisted in large part of the application of Italianate codes to Somaliland. The Penal 
Code for instance was drafted by an Italian lawyer in the early 1960s and was applied 
throughout independent Somalia: it was and is (in theory it still applies) a magnificent 
intellectual feat of no practical utility. Some of the old colonial statute law continued to 
apply in Somaliland but during the Barre era was slowly replaced by laws which owed 
little to specifically Italian influence.  
 
There was a conscious and deliberate campaign by Barre to wipe out and destroy the 
legal heritage of Somaliland. All the old British colonial collections of Somaliland statute 
laws were destroyed, the law reports in the High Court were looted and vanished. There 
are now no collections of any laws of any kind in Hargeisa38. Nor are there any persons 
with specific drafting skills. But this has not prevented Somaliland from basing their 
development on law.  
                                                 
37 Contini, P. (1969) The Somali Republic: an Experiment in Legal Integration, London. 
38 My informants were the Minister of Justice and the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the new University of 
Hargeisa. I was not able to visit any libraries or other places where some old laws might still exist. One of 
the officials in the City Council with whom I was working produced the Town Planning Ordinance of 1947 
(Cap. 83 of The Laws of the Somaliland Protectorate, 1950 edition) which I was told was still, in theory, in 
force. It was this official who had a prized copy of the English language version of the Penal Code. I went 
round the law library in the University in December 2009. It had virtually no law books of any kind 
whatsoever. Other towns in Somaliland do have old records. I was told by the former chief executive of 
Burao District Council that it has land records going back to the 18th century when the Ottoman Empire 
was the dominant power on the coast. 
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What is clearly happening is that Somaliland is slowly and inevitably some false starts – 
the laws on local government I was asked to comment on had had built into them several 
flash points of conflict between central and local government, between mayor and 
councillors and between councillors and officers which was partly a product of the 
universal ambivalence which central governments have over decentralising power to 
local governments and partly just a badly drafted law39 – creating a new autocthonous 
constitutional and legal system, geared to meeting its own needs and principles, and 
based on its own traditions. Kaplan puts it thus: 
 
Somaliland has achieved these successes by constructing a set of  
governing bodies rooted in traditional Somali concepts of governance 
by consultation and consent. In contrast to most postcolonial states in 
Africa and the Middle East, Somaliland has had a chance to administer 
itself using customary norms, values, and relationships. In fact, its 
integration of traditional ways of governance within a modern state 
apparatus has helped it to achieve greater cohesion and legitimacy and—
not coincidentally—create greater room for competitive elections and 
public criticism than exists in most similarly endowed territories40. 
 
The absence of international legal assistance is, in my view helping in the development of 
a truly national legal system, tailored to national needs. Nowhere is this more the case 
than with dispute settlement. Disputes in rural areas are handed almost exclusively by 
traditional authorities applying customary principles and/or ADR41. Courts exist in urban 
areas but do not have a very good reputation. Yet it must be emphasized that this is a 
society with a high level of commerce both national and international; with a banking and 
money transfer system capable of handling many millions of dollars of transactions 
having international elements and ramifications. Clearly the system works and must be 
based to a large degree on trust and honour, the foundation of any system of law.  
 
                                                 
39 My mission involved drafting a City of Hargeisa Law. I used models from several other Anglophone 
African countries. My draft was discussed at a workshop in December, 2003. The workshop included 
senior officials from the Ministry of Interior – the Ministry with responsibility for local government. There 
was unanimity that I had written into the draft too much power for the Minister to intervene in the affairs of 
the city council.  
40 Op. cit., footnote 23, 144. 
41 Academy for Peace and Development (2007) No more ‘Grass grown by the Spear’, Hargeisa. 
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Could it not be suggested that unlike the formal legal systems of so many states in Africa, 
the evolution of a legal system which derives its fundaments and direction from the 
culture and locally driven needs and decisions of the society in which the law is to apply 
is a more likely guarantee of ‘law and order’ i.e. acceptance of the need to observe and 
comply with the law, and so of development than the ambitious programmes of legal 
system reform now being mounted by the World Bank and many donors. The Somaliland 
system is an indigenous transformational one; World Bank imported systems are not.  
 
The people I met and worked with – councillors, officials, lawyers – were concerned to 
create and work under a law which they could understand and which would have 
resonance with the residents of the country: they had experienced the reverse and did not 
want a repeat. The same concern is very apparent in my missions in 2009 – 10 on 
developing a land policy and reforms to land laws. My task is not to write the policy or 
the laws – that is emphatically not wanted – but to work with the government and the 
community to develop a participative inclusive process leading to the creation of a policy 
and accompanying laws.  Far from there being a ‘failed state’ a ‘black hole’ in the Horn 
of Africa, there are people in Somaliland committed to building a state governed by law, 
willing to work with external assistance but not in any way dependent on it and 
determined to pursue their own way in a largely hostile world.  
 
Commentators have said that Somaliland is a ‘challenge’ to the international community; 
it is in many respects a threat for if it can succeed on its own and with minimal aid and 
this example begins to be followed by other countries in the South, where is the leverage 
over development and rule-of-law reform which the international community attempts to 
exert over so many countries. Where is the LPA with its veneer of democracy but its 
underlying message of markets open to all without restrictions. No wonder there is 
resistance to the recognition of a state which complies with every traditional formal 
requirement for recognition of a state in international law – a defined territory (the old 
British Somaliland Protectorate); a government with the monopoly of force within the 
state; and the support of the people.  
 
Of late there are some disturbing signs that internally Somaliland is showing signs of a 
rather traditional African presidential or electoral ailment – difficulties with accepting 
transparent election preparations. Elections which were due some years ago have been 
postponed so many times that the incumbent has almost served two terms – the second 
one unelected. In part this has been caused by chaotic voter registration – the 
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Government was misguided enough to allow itself to be persuaded that a foreign 
electronic voter registration system should be used that didn’t work and too easily 
became a vehicle for voter registration fraud but in part it is plain reluctance to meet the 
voters. Donors are now desperate to encourage elections to take place as soon as possible 
fearing a collapse of the state and a reversion to the fighting that characterised its early 
years. 
 
Externally, too there are what I would regard as disquieting signs that the World Bank is 
becoming interested in Somaliland. It is likely to subject the country to one of its 
diagnostic analysis of the legal, regulatory and procedural constraints facing investors in 
the country, a prelude to a report strongly recommending the dismantling of a range of 
legal and regulatory arrangements created to assist the operation of the Somaliland 
economy and opening it up to largely unregulated foreign investment. It is perfectly 
natural that Somaliland would wish to become an official part of the international 
community but it is open to question whether if the price was to be, in effect subject to a 
variant of the LPA, it would be a price which would benefit the average Somalilander.     
 
Conclusions 
 
Paris and Sisk offer a succinct summary of the evolution of both the actions of 
peacebuilding and statebuilding and scholarship on same: 
 
The missions launched between 1989 and 1997 may be viewed as a first 
generation of peacebuilding operations following the Cold 
War…Scholarship on peacebuildings during this initial period was also 
nascent. Most of the literature provided detailed descriptions of particular 
operations and countries, offering relatively little systematic cross-case 
analysis, or theorizing about the strategies or nature of the peacebuilding 
enterprise… 
By the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, however, the practice and study of 
peacebuilding underwent parallel transformations…Three new operations 
were deployed in 1999 – in Kosovo, Timor Leste and Sierra Leone...The 
mandates of these missions…were more expansive than their predecessors, 
reflecting a recognition that such operations needed to focus less on exit 
deadlines and more on achieving the conditions for basic stablility in these 
societies, including the functioning systems of public administration… 
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In parallel with the changing practices of peacebuilding, a second 
generation scholarship was coming to fruition in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, including more theoretical treatments and systematic cross-case 
comparisons… 
There are moments in every scholarly field when different writers 
independently arrive at similar conclusions at approximately the same time. 
This happened in 2004 with the publication of three books and two articles 
offering parallel critiques of peacebuilding theory and practice. In different 
ways, Francis Fukuyama, Simon Chesterman…argued that the operational 
concepts and implementation of peacebuilding had under-emphasised the 
creation or strengthening of governmental institutions as a foundation of 
successful transitions for war to peace… 
In the wake of these and other publications, statebuilding became a growing 
topic of interest within the peacebuilding scholarship and in documents 
produced by and for major intergovernmental and national development 
agencies…   
Today [2009] the future of peacebuilding and statebuilding is 
uncertain…and it is unclear what direction this experiment will take, or 
indeed whether it will proceed at all…Few observers seem willing to 
endorse the status quo but there is little agreement beyond that…42 
 
The critique from the direction of transformation goes beyond the kind of internal 
critiques that have usually surfaced but as Doe’s article makes clear, it can draw on an 
increasingly impressive array of supporters. It is undeniable however that as the cases 
discussed in this paper show, making progress with transformational practice will be 
much more difficult. One matter which Doe (and others) underestimate is the reluctance 
of the existing ruling classes and elites in African states and the international community 
to embrace a transformational approach.  
 
The LPA restores the existing ruling elites to positions of authority – at the price of the 
sacrifice of a few mavericks like Charles Taylor of Liberia to the ICC or a special 
tribunal to try persons for ‘war crimes’. It is expressly designed not to rock the boat 
whereas a transformational approach does the reverse: Somaliland is no longer part of 
Somalia and will never become part of Somalia again even though the international 
                                                 
42 R. Paris and T. D. Sisk, (2009) The Dilemmas of Statebuilding, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12       
 34
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community persists in pretending that that is not the case. No other postconflict 
government in Africa has emulated the dramatic steps taken by Museveni to confer full 
property rights on peasant farmers and it must be doubted whether the Museveni of 2010 
would take such steps as the Museveni of 1996 did. To the extent that the provisions of 
the Constitution and the Land Act 1998 might stand in the way of the newly created oil 
extraction industry, they will likely be ignored or revised. The international community 
has made no effort to hold the Sudanese government to its commitments under the CPA 
to restore customary tenure in the two transitional states of Blue Nile and Southern 
Kordofan and halt large scale land grants to foreign investors. Indeed, there was a 
conscious policy on the part of USAID after supporting an initial project to begin the 
process of implementing the special Protocol to the CPA with respect to those two states 
to end that project and commence another one with the unspoken aim of not rocking the 
boat on land issues in those states. Huge amounts of aid are being provided to Rwanda to 
create a statutory system of land tenure and ‘abolish’ customary tenure despite well 
documented (but carefully ignored) misgivings about the likely imbalance of land rights 
between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority that that policy will bring about. Non-
action in Liberia on the land issue has already been noted.         
 
Unlike Paris and Sisk then, I do not see any dramatic new approaches being developed in 
the peacebuilding and statebuilding industry (or for that matter in the post-disaster 
statebuilding industry – there is no more chance of President Aristide being allowed back 
into Haiti by the USA to lead a reconstruction effort designed to benefit all Haitians than 
there is of ex-President Bush (and ex-Prime Minister Blair) standing trial for war crimes 
at the Hague). This prompts an irreverent reflection: should a British academic, even one 
manqué like myself, be writing along these lines at all when the chances of having an 
impact on the real world is virtually nil? Well, stranger things have happened: one can 
point to some half-successes in going against the orthodoxies of development even if 
most of time, one is, wittingly or unwittingly, advancing it. So its worth discussing the 
limits and deficiencies of the LPA even if its alternative – full-blown transformation – is 
unlikely to be adopted in the foreseeable future. Nor, as the example of Somaliland 
shows, is there any guarantee that if a transformative approach is adopted, it will last: the 
temptations to succumb to internal political pressures and external economic pressures 
may be too great to resist. On that gloomy note I shall conclude.      
 
